dor_id: 4115694

506.#.#.a: Público

590.#.#.d: Cada artículo es evaluado mediante una revisión ciega única

510.0.#.a: Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Revistes Cientifiques de Ciencies Socials Humanitais (CARHUS Plus); Latinoamericanas en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (CLASE); Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH PLUS); Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); SCOPUS, Journal Storage (JSTOR); The Philosopher’s Index, Ulrich’s Periodical Directory

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650.#.4.x: Artes y Humanidades

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336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

351.#.#.b: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía

351.#.#.a: Artículos

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270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

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883.#.#.u: https://revistas.unam.mx/catalogo/

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590.#.#.a: Coordinación de Difusión Cultural

883.#.#.1: https://www.publicaciones.unam.mx/

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850.#.#.a: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

856.4.0.u: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/845/813

100.1.#.a: Garrido Garrido, Julián

524.#.#.a: Garrido Garrido, Julián (1992). Verdad como correspondencia con los hechos. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 24 Núm. 71, 1992; 35-52. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115694

245.1.0.a: Verdad como correspondencia con los hechos

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1992

264.#.1.c: 2018-12-14

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico alberto@filosoficas.unam.mx

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041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: The idea of truth as a correspondence between statements and facts which can be proved by observation, although intuitively plausiblebased on examples such as "this chalk is white"-, is vague-because the relation between statements and facts can be neither strictly physical as the relations between facts, nor argumentative as the relations between statements. This is an idea hard to give up in everyday practice, but also difficult to accept theoretically. It may however, be asumed as an hypothesis, so that its vagueness could be diminished with a critical analysis. Truth as a correspondence concems only to empirical truth and not to the remaining kinds of truth (logical, definitional and mathematical) that scientific knowledge implies. The correspondence between empirical truths and facts can be direct or undirect. Theoretical principles, experimentallaws and data are undirectly related to facts through predictions of observable evidences. The latteratomic statements which relate objects to observable properties-are the only ones which can adequately be directly related to facts, as their demonstration calls only for observation. The correspondence between true observable evidences and facts is not bijective. The expresive contents of observable evidences are in a sense defective and in another sense excessive with regard to the observed situations or to the facts which allow its verification. First of all, the observable evidences tell us about partial aspects of facts or observed situations. The same situation which confirms the statement: "This is white", could confirm many other observable evidences as: "this is a chalk", "this chalk is white", "this chalk stains", "this chalk is heavy", "this chalk is opaque" or "this chalk is smooth". Secondly, the observable evidences tell us about common aspects between the fact or the observed situation and many other different facts or situations. When we stated "this is white" we are saying "this belongs to the set of white things", set whose extension is not unitary. In sum, the observable evidences are at the same time partial and general in relation with the facts, which are regarding the former complex and singular. Partiality and generality of observable evidences are interrelated as they are aspects of the abstract quality of the statements. Statements (abstract) and facts (concrete) are therefore completely heterogeneous.

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 24 Núm. 71 (1992); 35-52

773.1.#.o: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

022.#.#.a: ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

310.#.#.a: Cuatrimestral

300.#.#.a: Páginas: 35-52

264.#.1.b: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1992.845

handle: 00ee283669fec136

harvesting_date: 2023-08-23 17:00:00.0

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245.1.0.b: Verdad como correspondencia con los hechos

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Artículo

Verdad como correspondencia con los hechos

Garrido Garrido, Julián

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Garrido Garrido, Julián (1992). Verdad como correspondencia con los hechos. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 24 Núm. 71, 1992; 35-52. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115694

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Garrido Garrido, Julián
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Verdad como correspondencia con los hechos
Fecha
2018-12-14
Resumen
The idea of truth as a correspondence between statements and facts which can be proved by observation, although intuitively plausiblebased on examples such as "this chalk is white"-, is vague-because the relation between statements and facts can be neither strictly physical as the relations between facts, nor argumentative as the relations between statements. This is an idea hard to give up in everyday practice, but also difficult to accept theoretically. It may however, be asumed as an hypothesis, so that its vagueness could be diminished with a critical analysis. Truth as a correspondence concems only to empirical truth and not to the remaining kinds of truth (logical, definitional and mathematical) that scientific knowledge implies. The correspondence between empirical truths and facts can be direct or undirect. Theoretical principles, experimentallaws and data are undirectly related to facts through predictions of observable evidences. The latteratomic statements which relate objects to observable properties-are the only ones which can adequately be directly related to facts, as their demonstration calls only for observation. The correspondence between true observable evidences and facts is not bijective. The expresive contents of observable evidences are in a sense defective and in another sense excessive with regard to the observed situations or to the facts which allow its verification. First of all, the observable evidences tell us about partial aspects of facts or observed situations. The same situation which confirms the statement: "This is white", could confirm many other observable evidences as: "this is a chalk", "this chalk is white", "this chalk stains", "this chalk is heavy", "this chalk is opaque" or "this chalk is smooth". Secondly, the observable evidences tell us about common aspects between the fact or the observed situation and many other different facts or situations. When we stated "this is white" we are saying "this belongs to the set of white things", set whose extension is not unitary. In sum, the observable evidences are at the same time partial and general in relation with the facts, which are regarding the former complex and singular. Partiality and generality of observable evidences are interrelated as they are aspects of the abstract quality of the statements. Statements (abstract) and facts (concrete) are therefore completely heterogeneous.
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

Enlaces