dor_id: 4115272

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590.#.#.d: Cada artículo es evaluado mediante una revisión ciega única

510.0.#.a: Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Revistes Cientifiques de Ciencies Socials Humanitais (CARHUS Plus); Latinoamericanas en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (CLASE); Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH PLUS); Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); SCOPUS, Journal Storage (JSTOR); The Philosopher’s Index, Ulrich’s Periodical Directory

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650.#.4.x: Artes y Humanidades

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336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

351.#.#.b: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía

351.#.#.a: Artículos

harvesting_group: RevistasUNAM

270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

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270.#.#.d: MX

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590.#.#.b: Concentrador

883.#.#.u: https://revistas.unam.mx/catalogo/

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883.#.#.1: https://www.publicaciones.unam.mx/

883.#.#.q: Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial

850.#.#.a: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

856.4.0.u: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/945/913

100.1.#.a: Saab, Salma

524.#.#.a: Saab, Salma (1994). Una posición intermedia entre el fisicalismo y el intencionalismo: Dennett. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 76-77, 1994; 205-227. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115272

245.1.0.a: Una posición intermedia entre el fisicalismo y el intencionalismo: Dennett

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1994

264.#.1.c: 2019-01-07

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico alberto@filosoficas.unam.mx

884.#.#.k: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/945

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041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: This article assesses Dennett’s position with respect to mental states, intermediate between the extremes of physicalism and intentionalism. Dennett concentrates most of his theses with respect to our atribution of mental states to others, or to other systems, on what he calls the intentional stance. One of his main claims is that, ontologically speaking, mental states as such do not exist but that nevertheless they do have some sort of reality. The elimination of mental entities as “abstracta”. These “abstracta” play an important role in our explanation of what people do and of the way in which certain systems are designed. Dennett assumes the correctness of Quine’s indeterminacy thesis of translation, which leads Quine to reject the existence of facts of the matter on the one hand and to admit the pragmatic value of certain non-physical explanations on the other. In the article, an attempt is made to clarify Quine’s thesis and the way in which Dennett’s use of the indeterminacy thesis differs from Davidson’s. It is suggested that one can make certain analogies between Dennett’s proposal and Wittgenstein’s use of the term “seeing as”. The analogy with “seeing as” has the advantage of preserving Dennett’s main claims, while eliminating the use for “abstracta”, thus avoiding the discomfort that some philosophers have felt with regard to “abstracta”. The identification of characteristics common to mental discourse and “seeing as” allows the author to make sense of the claim that there are certain aspects of things or of situations, such as patterns, which while they properly belong to the things or situations themselves, nevertheless depend for their recognition on the skills of the observer.

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 76-77 (1994); 205-227

773.1.#.o: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

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310.#.#.a: Cuatrimestral

300.#.#.a: Páginas: 205-227

264.#.1.b: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1994.945

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harvesting_date: 2023-08-23 17:00:00.0

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245.1.0.b: Una posición intermedia entre el fisicalismo y el intencionalismo: Dennett

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Artículo

Una posición intermedia entre el fisicalismo y el intencionalismo: Dennett

Saab, Salma

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Saab, Salma (1994). Una posición intermedia entre el fisicalismo y el intencionalismo: Dennett. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 76-77, 1994; 205-227. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115272

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Saab, Salma
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Una posición intermedia entre el fisicalismo y el intencionalismo: Dennett
Fecha
2019-01-07
Resumen
This article assesses Dennett’s position with respect to mental states, intermediate between the extremes of physicalism and intentionalism. Dennett concentrates most of his theses with respect to our atribution of mental states to others, or to other systems, on what he calls the intentional stance. One of his main claims is that, ontologically speaking, mental states as such do not exist but that nevertheless they do have some sort of reality. The elimination of mental entities as “abstracta”. These “abstracta” play an important role in our explanation of what people do and of the way in which certain systems are designed. Dennett assumes the correctness of Quine’s indeterminacy thesis of translation, which leads Quine to reject the existence of facts of the matter on the one hand and to admit the pragmatic value of certain non-physical explanations on the other. In the article, an attempt is made to clarify Quine’s thesis and the way in which Dennett’s use of the indeterminacy thesis differs from Davidson’s. It is suggested that one can make certain analogies between Dennett’s proposal and Wittgenstein’s use of the term “seeing as”. The analogy with “seeing as” has the advantage of preserving Dennett’s main claims, while eliminating the use for “abstracta”, thus avoiding the discomfort that some philosophers have felt with regard to “abstracta”. The identification of characteristics common to mental discourse and “seeing as” allows the author to make sense of the claim that there are certain aspects of things or of situations, such as patterns, which while they properly belong to the things or situations themselves, nevertheless depend for their recognition on the skills of the observer.
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

Enlaces