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Ver términos de la licencia Autor(es)
Rivadulla, Andrés
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Two Dogmas of Structural Realism. A Confirmation of a Philosophical Death Foretold
Fecha
2019-01-07
Resumen
Twenty years ago John Worrall offered an alleged non-standard viable form of scientific realism under the name ;structural realism. ;Structural realism was supposed to be both an alternative to standard scientific realism and viable form of realism. The central questions addressed in this paper are what I call the two dogmas of structural realism: the idea that there is structure retention across theory change, and the idea that theoretical structures describe the world. Arthur Fine proclaimed that scientific realism was dead. I claim that Worrall’s attempt to bring scientific realism back to life has failed.
Tema
scientific realism; no-miracle argument; pessimistic meta-induction; theoretical explanations; limiting cases; realismo científico; argumento del no milagro; metainducción pesimista; explicaciones teóricas; casos límite
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503
DOI
https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2010.890