dor_id: 46308

506.#.#.a: Público

590.#.#.d: Los artículos enviados a la revista "Investigación Económica", se juzgan por medio de un proceso de revisión por pares

510.0.#.a: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACyT); Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); Scientific Electronic Library Online (SciELO); SCOPUS, Web Of Science (WoS)

561.#.#.u: http://www.economia.unam.mx/

650.#.4.x: Ciencias Sociales y Económicas

336.#.#.b: article

336.#.#.3: Artículo de Investigación

336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: https://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rie

351.#.#.b: Investigación Económica

351.#.#.a: Artículos

harvesting_group: RevistasUNAM

270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

590.#.#.c: Open Journal Systems (OJS)

270.#.#.d: MX

270.1.#.d: México

590.#.#.b: Concentrador

883.#.#.u: https://revistas.unam.mx/catalogo/

883.#.#.a: Revistas UNAM

590.#.#.a: Coordinación de Difusión Cultural

883.#.#.1: https://www.publicaciones.unam.mx/

883.#.#.q: Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial

850.#.#.a: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

856.4.0.u: https://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rie/article/view/50496/45299

100.1.#.a: Toboso, Fernando

524.#.#.a: Toboso, Fernando (2013). THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS. Investigación Económica; Vol. 72 Núm. 286, 2013: ENG. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/46308

245.1.0.a: THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Facultad de Economía, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 2013

264.#.1.c: 2015-06-18

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico iph@unam.mx

884.#.#.k: https://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rie/article/view/50496

001.#.#.#: 071.oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/50496

041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: The aim here is two-fold. First, the author intends to show that the statement that the new institutionalists pay no attention to aspects of distribution can be refuted. To do that, he examines works by outstanding authors from this analytical tradition. In the second place, the article tackles the review and broadening of a very well-known, orthodox graphic toolkit to carry out a very persuasive systematic analysis of the main ways that institutional reform impacts distribution and influences the total volume of transaction costs for the participants in each institutional sphere. This analysis also makes it possible to underline that the rules that certain agents perceive as causes of the transaction costs they pay are viewed by others as the mechanisms that allow them to finally obtain better distributional results, at least in the short run, even if they have to pay the habitual transaction costs associated with any negotiation. Although these ideas are certainly foreign to the investigative process of many new institutionalists, this is not the case of others such as North, Eggertsson, Libecap, Ostrom, and even Williamson and Ménard. Obviously, this dimension of distribution is often of great concern for researchers who work in the framework of other currents of analysis, but the aim of this article is not to examine these other contributions, but to show that these aspects are gaining more and more ground in the framework of the new institutional economics.

773.1.#.t: Investigación Económica; Vol. 72 Núm. 286 (2013): ENG

773.1.#.o: https://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rie

022.#.#.a: ISSN electrónico: 2594-2360; ISSN impreso: 0185-1667

310.#.#.a: Trimestral

264.#.1.b: Facultad de Economía, UNAM

handle: 00a1792fdbec6646

harvesting_date: 2023-06-20 16:00:00.0

856.#.0.q: application/pdf

last_modified: 2023-06-20 16:00:00

license_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es

license_type: by-nc-nd

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