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590.#.#.d: Se reciben trabajos de cualquier autor independientemente de su ubicación geográfica y deben pasar por un proceso de revisión por pares doble ciego

510.0.#.a: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACyT); Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); Scientific Electronic Library Online (SciELO)

561.#.#.u: https://www.juridicas.unam.mx/

650.#.4.x: Ciencias Sociales y Económicas

336.#.#.b: article

336.#.#.3: Artículo de Investigación

336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/mexican-law-review/index

351.#.#.b: Mexican Law Review

351.#.#.a: Artículos

harvesting_group: RevistasUNAM

270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

590.#.#.c: Open Journal Systems (OJS)

270.#.#.d: MX

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590.#.#.b: Concentrador

883.#.#.u: https://revistas.unam.mx/catalogo/

883.#.#.a: Revistas UNAM

590.#.#.a: Coordinación de Difusión Cultural

883.#.#.1: https://www.publicaciones.unam.mx/

883.#.#.q: Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial

850.#.#.a: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

856.4.0.u: https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/mexican-law-review/article/view/10242/12502

100.1.#.a: Mexican Law Review

524.#.#.a: Mexican Law Review (2016). The Becoming-Other of Law: Preliminaries for a Citizen"s Conceptualization of Law. Mexican Law Review; Volume VIII, number 2, 2016; 147-165. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/21000

245.1.0.a: The Becoming-Other of Law: Preliminaries for a Citizen"s Conceptualization of Law

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 2016

264.#.1.c: 2016-01-01

653.#.#.a: Post-liberal democracy; Benjamín Arditi; apocryphal jurisprudence; post-liberal law; post-structuralist legal studies

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico mexlawrev@gmail.com

884.#.#.k: https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/mexican-law-review/article/view/10242

001.#.#.#: 081.oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/10242

041.#.7.h: eng

520.3.#.a: The author’s hypothesis is that modern legal theories view law solely from the standpoint of ruling class or, in Hartian language, from the external point of view. Why? In sume because legal philosophers have implicitly accepted law as the exclusive domain of government and partisan politics. This approach, however, has been disrupted by poststructuralist political developments, which serve as a powerful impetus to modify prevailing concepts. This analysis begins with Benjamín Arditi’s idea regarding what he calls “the becoming other of politics,” an argument to radically change how the law is conceived. It then examines a very particular point of the theory proposed by the legal philosopher Herbert Hart, who distinguishes between the “external” and “internal” points of view with respect to how the rules of a legal system may be described or evaluated. In effect, Hart distinguishes between: (i) the external aspect, which is the independently observable fact that people tend to obey rules with regularity; and (ii) the internal aspect, which is the obligation felt by most individuals to follow the rules. It is from this latter “internal sense” that the law acquires its normative quality. Unfortunately, Hart only applies the internal point of view to government officials, in effect rendering his thesis inconsistent. The article ends with a brief analysis of Dworkin’s Herculean judge theory, arguing that Dworkin also gets trapped between the paradigm of government and partisan politics.

773.1.#.t: Mexican Law Review; Volume VIII, number 2, january-june 2016; 147-165

773.1.#.o: https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/mexican-law-review/index

022.#.#.a: ISSN impreso: 1870-0578; ISSN electrónico: 2448-5306

310.#.#.a: Semestral

300.#.#.a: Páginas: 147-165

264.#.1.b: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM

doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mexlaw.2016.07.005

harvesting_date: 2023-10-03 16:10:00.0

856.#.0.q: application/pdf

last_modified: 2023-10-03 16:00:00

license_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es

license_type: by-nc-nd

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Artículo

The Becoming-Other of Law: Preliminaries for a Citizen"s Conceptualization of Law

Mexican Law Review

Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM, publicado en Mexican Law Review, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Entidad o dependencia
Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM
Revista
Repositorio
Contacto
Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

Cita

Mexican Law Review (2016). The Becoming-Other of Law: Preliminaries for a Citizen"s Conceptualization of Law. Mexican Law Review; Volume VIII, number 2, 2016; 147-165. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/21000

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Mexican Law Review
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Ciencias Sociales y Económicas
Título
The Becoming-Other of Law: Preliminaries for a Citizen"s Conceptualization of Law
Fecha
2016-01-01
Resumen
The author’s hypothesis is that modern legal theories view law solely from the standpoint of ruling class or, in Hartian language, from the external point of view. Why? In sume because legal philosophers have implicitly accepted law as the exclusive domain of government and partisan politics. This approach, however, has been disrupted by poststructuralist political developments, which serve as a powerful impetus to modify prevailing concepts. This analysis begins with Benjamín Arditi’s idea regarding what he calls “the becoming other of politics,” an argument to radically change how the law is conceived. It then examines a very particular point of the theory proposed by the legal philosopher Herbert Hart, who distinguishes between the “external” and “internal” points of view with respect to how the rules of a legal system may be described or evaluated. In effect, Hart distinguishes between: (i) the external aspect, which is the independently observable fact that people tend to obey rules with regularity; and (ii) the internal aspect, which is the obligation felt by most individuals to follow the rules. It is from this latter “internal sense” that the law acquires its normative quality. Unfortunately, Hart only applies the internal point of view to government officials, in effect rendering his thesis inconsistent. The article ends with a brief analysis of Dworkin’s Herculean judge theory, arguing that Dworkin also gets trapped between the paradigm of government and partisan politics.
Tema
Post-liberal democracy; Benjamín Arditi; apocryphal jurisprudence; post-liberal law; post-structuralist legal studies
Idioma
eng
ISSN
ISSN impreso: 1870-0578; ISSN electrónico: 2448-5306

Enlaces