Artículo

Reasoning about Non-Actual Possibilities. Problems with the Douven-Putnam Model-Theoretic Argument against Metaphysical Realism

Pérez Otero, Manuel

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía y cosechado de y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

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Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Pérez Otero, Manuel (2002). Reasoning about Non-Actual Possibilities. Problems with the Douven-Putnam Model-Theoretic Argument against Metaphysical Realism. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 34 Núm. 102, 2002; 29-45. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115828

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Pérez Otero, Manuel
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Reasoning about Non-Actual Possibilities. Problems with the Douven-Putnam Model-Theoretic Argument against Metaphysical Realism
Fecha
2019-01-08
Resumen
Igor Douven has offered an original reconstruction and defence of Putnam"s model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism. Douven"s construal has notable exegetical virtues, since it makes sense of some assumptions in Putnam"s argument which his opponents have considered question-begging or puzzling. In this article I provide an indirect defence of metaphysical realism, by showing why this new version of the anti-realist argument should also be rejected. The main problems in the Douven-Putnam argument come from ascribing to the realist a distorted view of correspondence truth. The view entails that when no feature selects just one of all the possible ;interpretations ;of language (the relations of reference between the terms and the world) the existence of an interpretation suffices to make true a (consistent) theory. The sensible realist is not committed to this extreme conception of correspondence truth.
Tema
truth; correspondence; semantic naturalism; reference; verdad; correspondencia; naturalismo semántico; referencia
Idioma
eng
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

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