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510.0.#.a: Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Revistes Cientifiques de Ciencies Socials Humanitais (CARHUS Plus); Latinoamericanas en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (CLASE); Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH PLUS); Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); SCOPUS, Journal Storage (JSTOR); The Philosopher’s Index, Ulrich’s Periodical Directory

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336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

351.#.#.b: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía

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856.4.0.u: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/737/710

100.1.#.a: Cruz, Manuel

524.#.#.a: Cruz, Manuel (1990). Origen y desembocadura de la acción: el sujeto inevitable. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 22 Núm. 64, 1990; 97-120. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115738

245.1.0.a: Origen y desembocadura de la acción: el sujeto inevitable

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1990

264.#.1.c: 2018-12-11

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico alberto@filosoficas.unam.mx

884.#.#.k: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/737

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041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: This paper formally deals with the unfolding of an answer to the question: to whom is an action to be ascribed? or, stated more precisely, it pretends to be an analysis of the principle that the action pertains to whom it is attributed to. In order to avoid falling into subjectivistic or individualistic positions, which might totally ascribe the meaning of an action solely to the agent, the matter is studied from the intersubjective control of the action —taking special account of the proposals advanced by Hart, Feinberg and Gardiner. Hence, the question of the “irresponsible action” (i.e. that one claimed by no one), through a consideration of the categories of ascription and responsibility, facilitates a restatement of the problem as to whether there exist different qualities of action and, in the affirmative, where the differences must he drawn. In this connection, special reference is made to Kotarbinski, Ryle, Danto, and Davidson, among others. A tentative conclusion, more than discarding the intention, reveals the necessity of restoring it in a more collective, public and all pervasive perspective; in other words, it discloses the convenience of taking into account the various modes of existence of the agent.

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 22 Núm. 64 (1990); 97-120

773.1.#.o: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

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doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1990.737

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245.1.0.b: Origin and Destiny of Action: the Unavoidable Subject

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No entro en nada

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Artículo

Origen y desembocadura de la acción: el sujeto inevitable

Cruz, Manuel

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Cruz, Manuel (1990). Origen y desembocadura de la acción: el sujeto inevitable. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 22 Núm. 64, 1990; 97-120. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115738

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Cruz, Manuel
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Origen y desembocadura de la acción: el sujeto inevitable
Fecha
2018-12-11
Resumen
This paper formally deals with the unfolding of an answer to the question: to whom is an action to be ascribed? or, stated more precisely, it pretends to be an analysis of the principle that the action pertains to whom it is attributed to. In order to avoid falling into subjectivistic or individualistic positions, which might totally ascribe the meaning of an action solely to the agent, the matter is studied from the intersubjective control of the action —taking special account of the proposals advanced by Hart, Feinberg and Gardiner. Hence, the question of the “irresponsible action” (i.e. that one claimed by no one), through a consideration of the categories of ascription and responsibility, facilitates a restatement of the problem as to whether there exist different qualities of action and, in the affirmative, where the differences must he drawn. In this connection, special reference is made to Kotarbinski, Ryle, Danto, and Davidson, among others. A tentative conclusion, more than discarding the intention, reveals the necessity of restoring it in a more collective, public and all pervasive perspective; in other words, it discloses the convenience of taking into account the various modes of existence of the agent.
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

Enlaces