dor_id: 4115528

506.#.#.a: Público

590.#.#.d: Cada artículo es evaluado mediante una revisión ciega única

510.0.#.a: Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Revistes Cientifiques de Ciencies Socials Humanitais (CARHUS Plus); Latinoamericanas en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (CLASE); Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH PLUS); Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); SCOPUS, Journal Storage (JSTOR); The Philosopher’s Index, Ulrich’s Periodical Directory

561.#.#.u: https://www.filosoficas.unam.mx/

650.#.4.x: Artes y Humanidades

336.#.#.b: article

336.#.#.3: Artículo de Investigación

336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

351.#.#.b: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía

351.#.#.a: Artículos

harvesting_group: RevistasUNAM

270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

590.#.#.c: Open Journal Systems (OJS)

270.#.#.d: MX

270.1.#.d: México

590.#.#.b: Concentrador

883.#.#.u: https://revistas.unam.mx/catalogo/

883.#.#.a: Revistas UNAM

590.#.#.a: Coordinación de Difusión Cultural

883.#.#.1: https://www.publicaciones.unam.mx/

883.#.#.q: Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial

850.#.#.a: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

856.4.0.u: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/429/416

100.1.#.a: Peña, Lorenzo

524.#.#.a: Peña, Lorenzo (1983). Negación dialéctica y lógica transitiva (I). Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 15 Núm. 43, 1983; 51-78. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115528

245.1.0.a: Negación dialéctica y lógica transitiva (I)

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1983

264.#.1.c: 2018-12-05

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico alberto@filosoficas.unam.mx

884.#.#.k: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/429

001.#.#.#: 034.oai:ojs2.132.248.184.97:article/429

041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: In this essay I bring up the issue of how to deal with dialectical views -especialIy with dialectic negation- from the standpoint of a transitive logic, which is a particular paraconsistent logic. After briefly tracing the development of the debate between dialectic thinkers and those who, hewing to entrenched logical theories, did out of hand reject any contradictorial proposal -up to recent developments of paraconsistent systems of mathematical logic- I canvass a variety of grounds shoring up the thesis of the contradictoriality of the world. Chief among them is fuzziness. The paper tries to show that fuzziness has nothing to do with uncertainty, and that accepting fuzzy sets and facts not only does not compel us to waive the law of excluded middle, but -on the base of reasonable presuppositions- entails recognition of that law"s relevant instances -the ones that purportedly ought to be dropped as true sentences, should fuzziness be acknowledged. True enough, fuzziness plus excluded middle leads to contradiction, i.e. to negation inconsistency. But then fuzziness is -or can he viewed as being- negation inconsistency, since a fuzzy situation is one wherein something neither is nor fails to be the case: which -in virtue of involutivity of simple negation and De Morgan laws- means that something both ia and yet is not the case. [L.P.]

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 15 Núm. 43 (1983); 51-78

773.1.#.o: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

022.#.#.a: ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

310.#.#.a: Cuatrimestral

300.#.#.a: Páginas: 51-78

264.#.1.b: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1983.429

handle: 5ce3e0dfae8f9365

harvesting_date: 2023-08-23 17:00:00.0

856.#.0.q: application/pdf

file_creation_date: 2010-10-12 18:30:03.0

file_modification_date: 2010-10-29 19:25:02.0

file_creator: Claudia Chavez

file_name: cb989c093d3a12d9293b6ec64072b0bce0d7caaeac2869573c5de8ad28d59f1b.pdf

file_pages_number: 28

file_format_version: application/pdf; version=1.5

file_size: 469046

245.1.0.b: Negación dialéctica y lógica transitiva (I)

last_modified: 2023-08-23 17:00:00

license_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es

license_type: by-nc-nd

No entro en nada

No entro en nada 2

Artículo

Negación dialéctica y lógica transitiva (I)

Peña, Lorenzo

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Peña, Lorenzo (1983). Negación dialéctica y lógica transitiva (I). Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 15 Núm. 43, 1983; 51-78. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115528

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Peña, Lorenzo
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Negación dialéctica y lógica transitiva (I)
Fecha
2018-12-05
Resumen
In this essay I bring up the issue of how to deal with dialectical views -especialIy with dialectic negation- from the standpoint of a transitive logic, which is a particular paraconsistent logic. After briefly tracing the development of the debate between dialectic thinkers and those who, hewing to entrenched logical theories, did out of hand reject any contradictorial proposal -up to recent developments of paraconsistent systems of mathematical logic- I canvass a variety of grounds shoring up the thesis of the contradictoriality of the world. Chief among them is fuzziness. The paper tries to show that fuzziness has nothing to do with uncertainty, and that accepting fuzzy sets and facts not only does not compel us to waive the law of excluded middle, but -on the base of reasonable presuppositions- entails recognition of that law"s relevant instances -the ones that purportedly ought to be dropped as true sentences, should fuzziness be acknowledged. True enough, fuzziness plus excluded middle leads to contradiction, i.e. to negation inconsistency. But then fuzziness is -or can he viewed as being- negation inconsistency, since a fuzzy situation is one wherein something neither is nor fails to be the case: which -in virtue of involutivity of simple negation and De Morgan laws- means that something both ia and yet is not the case. [L.P.]
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

Enlaces