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Mcmurtry, Vanda
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Necessity in the Concept of Causation
Fecha
2018-10-31
Resumen
I begin this paper by setting forth very briefly a common thesis about causation, i.e., that causes necessitate their effects. I then contrast this view of causation as necessitation with an opposing view of causation recently offered by G.E.M. Anscombe in “Causality and Determination”. The remainder of the paper is divided into five parts, and consists of an extended discussion of Anscombe’s claim that there is a concept of causation in which the notion of necessitation plays no role. First, I examine the principal example of “non-necessitating” causation described by Anscombe in order to see exactly what it is in the alleged causing event that makes one inclined to regard it as a cause. Three attempts to explain this inclination are found unsatisfactory and are dismissed. A fourth attempt is judged successful, but I argue that this final way of explaining why one is inclined to regard the alleged causing event as a cause does not imply that there is a concept of causation in which the notion of necessitation plays no role. Second, I consider two possible objections to Anscombe’s description of her principal example. The first objection is based on an appeal to determinism, while the second is based on an analogy with free action. Against both of these potential objections I offer counterarguments on Anscombe’s behalf. I conclude that her description is adequate. Third, I attempt to construct an example in which the events are causally related only if there is a concept of causation in which the notion of necessitation plays no role. I suggest why the belief that these events are causally related has some initial plausibility. In the final two parts I entertain two arguments which aim to show that the concept of non-necessitating causation required by my example is incoherent. The first argument is based on the apparent impossibility of isolating “causal systems,” while the second is based on the apparent impossibility of perceiving causation. I maintain that the first argument is unsuccessful. I contend, however, that the second argument is conclusive. I claim that it shows very clearly the extreme difficulty inherent in the separation of the ideas of causation and necessitation.[Summary by Vanda B. McMurtry]
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503
