dor_id: 4115323

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510.0.#.a: Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Revistes Cientifiques de Ciencies Socials Humanitais (CARHUS Plus); Latinoamericanas en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (CLASE); Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH PLUS); Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); SCOPUS, Journal Storage (JSTOR); The Philosopher’s Index, Ulrich’s Periodical Directory

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650.#.4.x: Artes y Humanidades

336.#.#.b: article

336.#.#.3: Artículo de Investigación

336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

351.#.#.b: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía

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856.4.0.u: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/942/910

100.1.#.a: Hansberg, Olbeth

524.#.#.a: Hansberg, Olbeth (1994). Miedo e incertidumbre. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 76-77, 1994; 155-184. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115323

245.1.0.a: Miedo e incertidumbre

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1994

264.#.1.c: 2019-01-07

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico alberto@filosoficas.unam.mx

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001.#.#.#: 034.oai:ojs2.132.248.184.97:article/942

041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: Fear and Uncertainty discusses Robert Gordon’s thesis according to which fear is an epistemic —as opposed to factive— emotion inasmuch as S’s fearing p requires S’s being uncertain whether p or ∼p, and also requires that the uncertainty implicit in fearing be of a non-deliberative or ‘external’ kind. Hansberg argues against both parts of this thesis, which purports to offer part of the structure of the emotion of fear. First, she says, Gordon cannot account for those cases of weakness of the will in which an agent fears that when the moment comes he himself will not act upon his own previous purpose. So an external uncertainty proves to be not so essential a requisite. Now, what about the uncertainty, whatever its form, condition? Hansberg finds several examples in which someone fears p even though he actually is certain that p (when one fears, forexample, a medical treatment known to be painful, or when one fears one’s own inminent death, say, by suicide). She also argues against Gordon’s distinction between propositional fearsand mere ‘states of fear’ with no semantic content, and disapproves of his inclusion of certain fears —like fear of a violent death, fear of injury to oneself, and many phobias— in the lattercategory. Those supposedly non-propositional states can, and often do, give rise to propositional states and intentional actions; so Gordon would have to explain how this is possible: some of those supposedly mere states of fear need a place in an explanationby- reasons scheme. Finally, Hansberg claims that all fears do have a propositional structure, even though some fears have it in a concealed way. So, for example, if someone is afraid of death, he is afraid that he will die young, or that he will go to hell, and so on. Thus it is always possible to find propositional contents for fears which apparently have none, although in some cases this might be a difficult task. [Laura Lecuona]

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 76-77 (1994); 155-184

773.1.#.o: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

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310.#.#.a: Cuatrimestral

300.#.#.a: Páginas: 155-184

264.#.1.b: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1994.942

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245.1.0.b: Miedo e incertidumbre

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Artículo

Miedo e incertidumbre

Hansberg, Olbeth

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Hansberg, Olbeth (1994). Miedo e incertidumbre. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 76-77, 1994; 155-184. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115323

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Hansberg, Olbeth
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Miedo e incertidumbre
Fecha
2019-01-07
Resumen
Fear and Uncertainty discusses Robert Gordon’s thesis according to which fear is an epistemic —as opposed to factive— emotion inasmuch as S’s fearing p requires S’s being uncertain whether p or ∼p, and also requires that the uncertainty implicit in fearing be of a non-deliberative or ‘external’ kind. Hansberg argues against both parts of this thesis, which purports to offer part of the structure of the emotion of fear. First, she says, Gordon cannot account for those cases of weakness of the will in which an agent fears that when the moment comes he himself will not act upon his own previous purpose. So an external uncertainty proves to be not so essential a requisite. Now, what about the uncertainty, whatever its form, condition? Hansberg finds several examples in which someone fears p even though he actually is certain that p (when one fears, forexample, a medical treatment known to be painful, or when one fears one’s own inminent death, say, by suicide). She also argues against Gordon’s distinction between propositional fearsand mere ‘states of fear’ with no semantic content, and disapproves of his inclusion of certain fears —like fear of a violent death, fear of injury to oneself, and many phobias— in the lattercategory. Those supposedly non-propositional states can, and often do, give rise to propositional states and intentional actions; so Gordon would have to explain how this is possible: some of those supposedly mere states of fear need a place in an explanationby- reasons scheme. Finally, Hansberg claims that all fears do have a propositional structure, even though some fears have it in a concealed way. So, for example, if someone is afraid of death, he is afraid that he will die young, or that he will go to hell, and so on. Thus it is always possible to find propositional contents for fears which apparently have none, although in some cases this might be a difficult task. [Laura Lecuona]
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

Enlaces