dor_id: 4115368

506.#.#.a: Público

590.#.#.d: Cada artículo es evaluado mediante una revisión ciega única

510.0.#.a: Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Revistes Cientifiques de Ciencies Socials Humanitais (CARHUS Plus); Latinoamericanas en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (CLASE); Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH PLUS); Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); SCOPUS, Journal Storage (JSTOR); The Philosopher’s Index, Ulrich’s Periodical Directory

561.#.#.u: https://www.filosoficas.unam.mx/

650.#.4.x: Artes y Humanidades

336.#.#.b: article

336.#.#.3: Artículo de Investigación

336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

351.#.#.b: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía

351.#.#.a: Artículos

harvesting_group: RevistasUNAM

270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

590.#.#.c: Open Journal Systems (OJS)

270.#.#.d: MX

270.1.#.d: México

590.#.#.b: Concentrador

883.#.#.u: https://revistas.unam.mx/catalogo/

883.#.#.a: Revistas UNAM

590.#.#.a: Coordinación de Difusión Cultural

883.#.#.1: https://www.publicaciones.unam.mx/

883.#.#.q: Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial

850.#.#.a: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

856.4.0.u: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/888/859

100.1.#.a: Martínez, Sergio

524.#.#.a: Martínez, Sergio (1993). Método, evolución y progreso en la ciencia. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 74, 1993; 3-21. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115368

245.1.0.a: Método, evolución y progreso en la ciencia

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1993

264.#.1.c: 2019-01-07

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico alberto@filosoficas.unam.mx

884.#.#.k: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/888

001.#.#.#: 034.oai:ojs2.132.248.184.97:article/888

041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: In this paper I address the problem of characterizing a notion of scientific or cognitive progress. I show that there is a close connection between the different characterizations of scientific method and notions of progress. Until the early sixties, a very common (often implicit) assumption was that progress could be understood as a by-product of the use of the scientific method. The work of Thomas Kuhn made clear that such a simple minded characterization of progress could not be right. I examine a series of attempts aiming to spell out a notion of scientific progress, and argue that an underlying assumption of these proposals is an assumption about the underlying methodological unity of science. I claim that it is important for the correct formulations of a series of problems in the philosophy of science, and for the problem of characterizing progress in particular, to draw a distinction among different sorts of traditions in science. Each tradition articulates different explanatory aims, methods and notions of progress. In this paper I spell out a notion of cognitive progress that is implicit in experimental traditions. In future work I will discuss the notions of progress associated with other traditions. In experimental traditions progress is understood in terms of the stabilization of phenomena and their entrenchment. A phenomenon gets entrenched when it is used for the construction of other phenomena. In order to understand the epistemological significance of the entrenchment of phenomena it is necessary to show that the traditional understanding of laws of nature in theoretical traditions, and in most philosophical accounts, is not suitable to understand the sense in which experimentalists talk of the “manipulation of laws of nature”. I provide a series of examples in order to clarify to concepts of phenomenon and entrenchment of phenomena which are important in experimental traditions. I suggest that the process of entrenchment of phenomena can be understood as a generalized evolutionary process. In that way, the analogy between progress and evolution, a topic of heated discussions for over a century, can help to elucidate the dynamics of experimental traditions in science.

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 74 (1993); 3-21

773.1.#.o: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

022.#.#.a: ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

310.#.#.a: Cuatrimestral

300.#.#.a: Páginas: 3-21

264.#.1.b: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1993.888

handle: 00b4569dca9c59ed

harvesting_date: 2023-08-23 17:00:00.0

856.#.0.q: application/pdf

file_creation_date: 2010-10-05 16:07:57.0

file_modification_date: 2010-10-27 21:08:11.0

file_name: 7db16869e601f4048eb65071e397ef754c4743adc410b622da8986084cc73632.pdf

file_pages_number: 19

file_format_version: application/pdf; version=1.6

file_size: 60534

245.1.0.b: Method, Evolution and Progress in Science

last_modified: 2023-08-23 17:00:00

license_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es

license_type: by-nc-nd

No entro en nada

No entro en nada 2

Artículo

Método, evolución y progreso en la ciencia

Martínez, Sergio

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Martínez, Sergio (1993). Método, evolución y progreso en la ciencia. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 74, 1993; 3-21. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115368

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Martínez, Sergio
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Método, evolución y progreso en la ciencia
Fecha
2019-01-07
Resumen
In this paper I address the problem of characterizing a notion of scientific or cognitive progress. I show that there is a close connection between the different characterizations of scientific method and notions of progress. Until the early sixties, a very common (often implicit) assumption was that progress could be understood as a by-product of the use of the scientific method. The work of Thomas Kuhn made clear that such a simple minded characterization of progress could not be right. I examine a series of attempts aiming to spell out a notion of scientific progress, and argue that an underlying assumption of these proposals is an assumption about the underlying methodological unity of science. I claim that it is important for the correct formulations of a series of problems in the philosophy of science, and for the problem of characterizing progress in particular, to draw a distinction among different sorts of traditions in science. Each tradition articulates different explanatory aims, methods and notions of progress. In this paper I spell out a notion of cognitive progress that is implicit in experimental traditions. In future work I will discuss the notions of progress associated with other traditions. In experimental traditions progress is understood in terms of the stabilization of phenomena and their entrenchment. A phenomenon gets entrenched when it is used for the construction of other phenomena. In order to understand the epistemological significance of the entrenchment of phenomena it is necessary to show that the traditional understanding of laws of nature in theoretical traditions, and in most philosophical accounts, is not suitable to understand the sense in which experimentalists talk of the “manipulation of laws of nature”. I provide a series of examples in order to clarify to concepts of phenomenon and entrenchment of phenomena which are important in experimental traditions. I suggest that the process of entrenchment of phenomena can be understood as a generalized evolutionary process. In that way, the analogy between progress and evolution, a topic of heated discussions for over a century, can help to elucidate the dynamics of experimental traditions in science.
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

Enlaces