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506.#.#.a: Público

590.#.#.d: Cada artículo es evaluado mediante una revisión ciega única. Los revisores son externos nacionales e internacionales.

510.0.#.a: Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Revistes Cientifiques de Ciencies Socials Humanitais (CARHUS Plus), Latinoamericanas en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (CLASE), Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH PLUS), Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex), SCOPUS, Journal Storage (JSTOR), The Philosopher’s Index, Ulrich’s Periodical Directory

561.#.#.u: http://www.filosoficas.unam.mx/

650.#.4.x: Artes y Humanidades

336.#.#.b: article

336.#.#.3: Artículo de Investigación

336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

351.#.#.b: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía

351.#.#.a: Artículos

harvesting_group: RevistasUNAM

270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

590.#.#.c: Open Journal Systems (OJS)

270.#.#.d: MX

270.1.#.d: México

590.#.#.b: Concentrador

883.#.#.u: http://www.revistas.unam.mx/front/

883.#.#.a: Revistas UNAM

590.#.#.a: Coordinación de Difusión Cultural, UNAM

883.#.#.1: https://www.publicaciones.unam.mx/

883.#.#.q: Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM

850.#.#.a: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

856.4.0.u: http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/125/117

100.1.#.a: Ferrater Mora, José

524.#.#.a: Ferrater Mora, José (1971). Lógica y razón. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol 5 No 15, 1971; 29-44. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115802

245.1.0.a: Lógica y razón

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1971

264.#.1.c: 2018-10-30

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, fecha de asignación de la licencia 2018-10-30, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico alberto@filosoficas.unam.mx

884.#.#.k: http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/125

001.#.#.#: critica:oai:ojs2.132.248.184.97:article/125

041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: ‘Logic’ is taken here exclusively as ‘formal logic’, not as ‘informal logic’. It is asserted that although logic is neutral, in the sense at least of being topic-free, it can be used in the formulation and treatment of philosophical problems. Furthermore, some philosophical problems may be raised in logic. This does not mean that logic is a part of, or a propedeutic to, philosophy. There are between logic and philosophy “special relations”. These have been particularly intense in some philosophical schools, but questions have been raised as of recent about whether patterning of philosophical thought on logical structures and/or concepts has not gone too far. It has been pointed out, moreover, that if logical has “failed” (in philosophy), reason has failed as well. The author does not think that either logic or reason has failed in philosophy. What may have failed is the idea that logic is to be equated to Reason, and the latter is to be compared to a kind of “Supreme Court” which has the power to give a final decision to all controversies. There is no reason why logic should be equated to Reason, and there is no reason why Reason should be capitalized. Rather than Reason there are “reason”, multitude of “courts” to which discussants appeal and which are not necessarily unrelated one to the other, but are not subordinated to one “Grand Court of Reason”. Formal logic is one of the ingredients in these various “courts”. Although it is not the court member that ultimately “decides”, it is the one which tends to “unify” the degree of unification depending about the subject matter discussed. In this sense logic is a kind of “normalizer” a point that is often made when the normalizing power of formal logic is emphasized. To be sure, there is no such thing as “the logic”, nor is any formal logic immune to changes. This, however, rather than discourage the “special relations” between philosophy and logic, should tend to intensify them. Resumen

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol 5 No 15 (1971); 29-44

773.1.#.o: http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

046.#.#.j: 2021-09-28 00:00:00.000000

022.#.#.a: ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

310.#.#.a: Cuatrimestral

300.#.#.a: Páginas: 29-44

264.#.1.b: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

758.#.#.1: http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1971.125

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245.1.0.b: Lógica y razón

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No entro en nada

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Artículo

Lógica y razón

Ferrater Mora, José

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Ferrater Mora, José (1971). Lógica y razón. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol 5 No 15, 1971; 29-44. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115802

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Ferrater Mora, José
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Lógica y razón
Fecha
2018-10-30
Resumen
‘Logic’ is taken here exclusively as ‘formal logic’, not as ‘informal logic’. It is asserted that although logic is neutral, in the sense at least of being topic-free, it can be used in the formulation and treatment of philosophical problems. Furthermore, some philosophical problems may be raised in logic. This does not mean that logic is a part of, or a propedeutic to, philosophy. There are between logic and philosophy “special relations”. These have been particularly intense in some philosophical schools, but questions have been raised as of recent about whether patterning of philosophical thought on logical structures and/or concepts has not gone too far. It has been pointed out, moreover, that if logical has “failed” (in philosophy), reason has failed as well. The author does not think that either logic or reason has failed in philosophy. What may have failed is the idea that logic is to be equated to Reason, and the latter is to be compared to a kind of “Supreme Court” which has the power to give a final decision to all controversies. There is no reason why logic should be equated to Reason, and there is no reason why Reason should be capitalized. Rather than Reason there are “reason”, multitude of “courts” to which discussants appeal and which are not necessarily unrelated one to the other, but are not subordinated to one “Grand Court of Reason”. Formal logic is one of the ingredients in these various “courts”. Although it is not the court member that ultimately “decides”, it is the one which tends to “unify” the degree of unification depending about the subject matter discussed. In this sense logic is a kind of “normalizer” a point that is often made when the normalizing power of formal logic is emphasized. To be sure, there is no such thing as “the logic”, nor is any formal logic immune to changes. This, however, rather than discourage the “special relations” between philosophy and logic, should tend to intensify them. Resumen
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

Enlaces