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510.0.#.a: Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Revistes Cientifiques de Ciencies Socials Humanitais (CARHUS Plus), Latinoamericanas en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (CLASE), Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH PLUS), Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex), SCOPUS, Journal Storage (JSTOR), The Philosopher’s Index, Ulrich’s Periodical Directory

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336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

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270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

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590.#.#.a: Coordinación de Difusión Cultural, UNAM

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883.#.#.q: Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM

850.#.#.a: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

856.4.0.u: http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/294/285

100.1.#.a: Caracciolo, Ricardo Alberto

524.#.#.a: Caracciolo, Ricardo Alberto (1979). Fundamentos del derecho y fundamentos del conocimiento del derecho. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol 11 No 31, 1979; 35-53. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115625

245.1.0.a: Fundamentos del derecho y fundamentos del conocimiento del derecho

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1979

264.#.1.c: 2018-11-09

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, fecha de asignación de la licencia 2018-11-09, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico alberto@filosoficas.unam.mx

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520.3.#.a: The recent discussion about foundations of scientific knowledge has affected the social sciences and the knowledge of law. The traditional answers, those of the empiricist and of the rational intuitionists, have been questioned and we could talk of a “crisis of the justificationist model”. In the foundation of juridical knowledge there are two basic questions: Are there basic statements in the legal science? If so, how are they justified? However, most of the proposed solutions refer not to these questions, but rather to the problem of the normative foundations of the law as a system of norms. In fact, Kelsen´s “basic norm” seems to be a foundation both of the law and of its knowledge, which creates a typical source of confusion. Two alternatives are analyzed in this article: Are the Statements that constitute the foundations norms or are they theoretical statements? According to the first, legal scientists formulate normative statements and not theoretical ones. The question is, then, how to justify the basic norms, whether by reason alone or with empirical help. According to the second, theoretical statements can justify the validity of the norms. If that is not possible, then the only thing that can be done is to justify the knowledge of the law, but not the law itself. Another interpretation would be to consider both justifications as parallel though not as identical, taking the basic statements of the legal science as corresponding to the basic legal norms. The normative language about the norms would be isomorphic. According to this view, the unity of legal science is a “reflex” of the systematic character of the legal “reality”. After pointing out several objections to this view, the author considers a possible solution, offered by Kelsen´s neo-Kantian version, that holds that the conceptual apparatus used to describe the legal norms is an epistemological category necessary for the knowledge of legal reality. The author carefully analyzes the consequences of this thesis and concludes that it is only a rationalist version of ‘justificationism’, open to the standard objections made to all models of this sort. [Javier Esquivel] Resumen

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol 11 No 31 (1979); 35-53

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doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1979.294

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Artículo

Fundamentos del derecho y fundamentos del conocimiento del derecho

Caracciolo, Ricardo Alberto

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Caracciolo, Ricardo Alberto (1979). Fundamentos del derecho y fundamentos del conocimiento del derecho. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol 11 No 31, 1979; 35-53. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115625

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Caracciolo, Ricardo Alberto
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Fundamentos del derecho y fundamentos del conocimiento del derecho
Fecha
2018-11-09
Resumen
The recent discussion about foundations of scientific knowledge has affected the social sciences and the knowledge of law. The traditional answers, those of the empiricist and of the rational intuitionists, have been questioned and we could talk of a “crisis of the justificationist model”. In the foundation of juridical knowledge there are two basic questions: Are there basic statements in the legal science? If so, how are they justified? However, most of the proposed solutions refer not to these questions, but rather to the problem of the normative foundations of the law as a system of norms. In fact, Kelsen´s “basic norm” seems to be a foundation both of the law and of its knowledge, which creates a typical source of confusion. Two alternatives are analyzed in this article: Are the Statements that constitute the foundations norms or are they theoretical statements? According to the first, legal scientists formulate normative statements and not theoretical ones. The question is, then, how to justify the basic norms, whether by reason alone or with empirical help. According to the second, theoretical statements can justify the validity of the norms. If that is not possible, then the only thing that can be done is to justify the knowledge of the law, but not the law itself. Another interpretation would be to consider both justifications as parallel though not as identical, taking the basic statements of the legal science as corresponding to the basic legal norms. The normative language about the norms would be isomorphic. According to this view, the unity of legal science is a “reflex” of the systematic character of the legal “reality”. After pointing out several objections to this view, the author considers a possible solution, offered by Kelsen´s neo-Kantian version, that holds that the conceptual apparatus used to describe the legal norms is an epistemological category necessary for the knowledge of legal reality. The author carefully analyzes the consequences of this thesis and concludes that it is only a rationalist version of ‘justificationism’, open to the standard objections made to all models of this sort. [Javier Esquivel] Resumen
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

Enlaces