dor_id: 4115577

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510.0.#.a: Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Revistes Cientifiques de Ciencies Socials Humanitais (CARHUS Plus); Latinoamericanas en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (CLASE); Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH PLUS); Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); SCOPUS, Journal Storage (JSTOR); The Philosopher’s Index, Ulrich’s Periodical Directory

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650.#.4.x: Artes y Humanidades

336.#.#.b: article

336.#.#.3: Artículo de Investigación

336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

351.#.#.b: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía

351.#.#.a: Artículos

harvesting_group: RevistasUNAM.34

270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

590.#.#.c: Open Journal Systems (OJS)

270.#.#.d: MX

270.1.#.d: México

590.#.#.b: Concentrador

883.#.#.u: https://revistas.unam.mx/catalogo/

883.#.#.a: Revistas UNAM

590.#.#.a: Coordinación de Difusión Cultural

883.#.#.1: https://www.publicaciones.unam.mx/

883.#.#.q: Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial

850.#.#.a: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

856.4.0.u: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/658/634

100.1.#.a: Cassini, Alejandro

524.#.#.a: Cassini, Alejandro (1988). Foundationalism in Aristotelian Epistemology. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 20 Núm. 58, 1988; 67-95. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115577

245.1.0.a: Foundationalism in Aristotelian Epistemology

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1988

264.#.1.c: 2018-12-10

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico critica.ojs@filosoficas.unam.mx

884.#.#.k: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/658

001.#.#.#: 034.oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/658

041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: The aim of this paper is to make an evaluation of the Aristotelian axiomatic method of justification of knowledge in the light of the epistemological foundationalism. Its main theses are: 1) the Aristotelian axiomatic model of justification is an example of foundationalism in the wide sense of the term, which not restrains it to empiricism. 2) Aristotle’s foundationalism consists exclusively in his postulation of proper principles, but not in that of the common axioms. 3) His foundationalism is not based upon the immediate access —by perception or intellectual intuition— to the basic knowledges. The first principles of science are not data, and they are not evident nor self-justified. 4) The principles are not incorrigible statements, because their discovery is fallible. Moreover, they admit to be justified by a dialectical procedure. 5) Aristotle’s fallibilism is strongly limited: the principles are not —like in some modern epistemologies— always provisional. They become, in a finite time, necessary truths. This occurs when an essential definition is discovered after a mediate process, which has an inductive-dialectic character. These definitions are the proper principles of each science, strictly the foundations, and they are, once stated, incorrigible. The fallibilism of the process of discovery is not essential, but, according to Aristotle, accidental. 6) These assumptions produce two “absolutist” features in the Aristotelian conception of scientific knowledge: a) it is not provisional, but definitive; b) it is capable of to be complete. 7) Both features are supported by the basic assumption that a science is a finite set of necessary truths. 8) In this rigid model of scientific justification there is a scarce place for the concept of progress.

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 20 Núm. 58 (1988); 67-95

773.1.#.o: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

022.#.#.a: ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

310.#.#.a: Cuatrimestral

300.#.#.a: Páginas: 67-95

599.#.#.a: 34

264.#.1.b: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1988.658

harvesting_date: 2024-02-23 00:00:00.0

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