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100.1.#.a: Rodríguez Consuegra, Francisco

524.#.#.a: Rodríguez Consuegra, Francisco (1991). El logicismo russelliano: su significado filosófico. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 23 Núm. 67, 1991; 15-39. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115491

245.1.0.a: El logicismo russelliano: su significado filosófico

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1991

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520.3.#.a: After a brief presentation of Russell" s logicism, I attempt a global explanation of its philosophical significance. I reject the existence of two different kinds of logicism (Putnam) with the argument that Russell was trying to justify the existing mathematics and, at the same time, to escape from a mere formal calculus. For the same reason, the logicist definitions cannot be regarded as new axioms to be added to Peano"s postulates (Reichenbach): according to Russell it is necessary to show that there is a constant meaning satisfying those postulates. The lack of a clear definition of logic in Russell (and Frege) is a consequence of his whole philosophy, therefore we must not look for it in the concept of necessity (Griffin), nor must we interpret this lack as a gap in the system (Grattan-Guinness). Russell"s starting point was Moore"s notion of truth as something indefinable and intuitive according to which we immediately recognize the true propositions. The problem of logicism is rather the deep tension between the ontological preeminence of relations (structures) and their terms (fields). [F.R.C.]

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 23 Núm. 67 (1991); 15-39

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doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1991.792

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245.1.0.b: El logicismo russelliano: su significado filosófico

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Artículo

El logicismo russelliano: su significado filosófico

Rodríguez Consuegra, Francisco

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Rodríguez Consuegra, Francisco (1991). El logicismo russelliano: su significado filosófico. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 23 Núm. 67, 1991; 15-39. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115491

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Rodríguez Consuegra, Francisco
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
El logicismo russelliano: su significado filosófico
Fecha
2018-12-13
Resumen
After a brief presentation of Russell" s logicism, I attempt a global explanation of its philosophical significance. I reject the existence of two different kinds of logicism (Putnam) with the argument that Russell was trying to justify the existing mathematics and, at the same time, to escape from a mere formal calculus. For the same reason, the logicist definitions cannot be regarded as new axioms to be added to Peano"s postulates (Reichenbach): according to Russell it is necessary to show that there is a constant meaning satisfying those postulates. The lack of a clear definition of logic in Russell (and Frege) is a consequence of his whole philosophy, therefore we must not look for it in the concept of necessity (Griffin), nor must we interpret this lack as a gap in the system (Grattan-Guinness). Russell"s starting point was Moore"s notion of truth as something indefinable and intuitive according to which we immediately recognize the true propositions. The problem of logicism is rather the deep tension between the ontological preeminence of relations (structures) and their terms (fields). [F.R.C.]
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

Enlaces