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100.1.#.a: Ramos, Pedro

524.#.#.a: Ramos, Pedro (1994). El enigma de Kripke: una solución formal-intensional. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 76-77, 1994; 51-92. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115468

245.1.0.a: El enigma de Kripke: una solución formal-intensional

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1994

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506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico alberto@filosoficas.unam.mx

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001.#.#.#: 034.oai:ojs2.132.248.184.97:article/930

041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: In this article, as its title says, I present a formal solution in the intensional line to Kripke’s paradoxes on belief. I analize and formalize the main three cases he expounds, about Tully-Cicero, Paderewski and Londres-London, according to his principles and presuppositions in one version, I think, developing my solution to each case in another. My idea is that if Kripke’s principles and presuppositions lead to paradoxical ascriptions of belief in these cases, that is enough to suspect that they cannot have the non-restrictive application Kripke thinks they have. My solution to those paradoxes fundamentally presupposes the following facts (or at least I think it does): (i) the existence of idiolects; (ii) the existence of dispositions to substitution of expressions inside the sentences that subjects assent to, which are able to show the idiosyncratic understanding of certain expressions possessed by some subjects in some cases; and (iii) with respect to the “meaning” of proper names, that it is only necessary to take into account their idiosyncratic reference and the mentioned dispositions. (i)–(iii) allow us to see a solution to the paradoxes intermediate between Fregean solutions and Russellian ones, as it does not presuppose so much as the Fregean notion of sense nor so little as the Kripkean thesis that the meaning of names is just their reference.

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 76-77 (1994); 51-92

773.1.#.o: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

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300.#.#.a: Páginas: 51-92

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doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1994.930

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harvesting_date: 2023-08-23 17:00:00.0

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245.1.0.b: El enigma de Kripke: una solución formal-intensional

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Artículo

El enigma de Kripke: una solución formal-intensional

Ramos, Pedro

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Ramos, Pedro (1994). El enigma de Kripke: una solución formal-intensional. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 76-77, 1994; 51-92. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115468

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Ramos, Pedro
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
El enigma de Kripke: una solución formal-intensional
Fecha
2019-01-07
Resumen
In this article, as its title says, I present a formal solution in the intensional line to Kripke’s paradoxes on belief. I analize and formalize the main three cases he expounds, about Tully-Cicero, Paderewski and Londres-London, according to his principles and presuppositions in one version, I think, developing my solution to each case in another. My idea is that if Kripke’s principles and presuppositions lead to paradoxical ascriptions of belief in these cases, that is enough to suspect that they cannot have the non-restrictive application Kripke thinks they have. My solution to those paradoxes fundamentally presupposes the following facts (or at least I think it does): (i) the existence of idiolects; (ii) the existence of dispositions to substitution of expressions inside the sentences that subjects assent to, which are able to show the idiosyncratic understanding of certain expressions possessed by some subjects in some cases; and (iii) with respect to the “meaning” of proper names, that it is only necessary to take into account their idiosyncratic reference and the mentioned dispositions. (i)–(iii) allow us to see a solution to the paradoxes intermediate between Fregean solutions and Russellian ones, as it does not presuppose so much as the Fregean notion of sense nor so little as the Kripkean thesis that the meaning of names is just their reference.
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

Enlaces