dor_id: 4115442

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510.0.#.a: Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Revistes Cientifiques de Ciencies Socials Humanitais (CARHUS Plus); Latinoamericanas en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (CLASE); Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH PLUS); Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); SCOPUS, Journal Storage (JSTOR); The Philosopher’s Index, Ulrich’s Periodical Directory

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650.#.4.x: Artes y Humanidades

336.#.#.b: article

336.#.#.3: Artículo de Investigación

336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

351.#.#.b: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía

351.#.#.a: Artículos

harvesting_group: RevistasUNAM

270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

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883.#.#.u: https://revistas.unam.mx/catalogo/

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856.4.0.u: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/651/628

100.1.#.a: Rosenkrantz, Carlos

524.#.#.a: Rosenkrantz, Carlos (1897). El dilema de los prisioneros y la moral. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 19 Núm. 57, 1897; 87-107. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115442

245.1.0.a: El dilema de los prisioneros y la moral

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1897

264.#.1.c: 2018-12-10

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico alberto@filosoficas.unam.mx

884.#.#.k: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/651

001.#.#.#: 034.oai:ojs2.132.248.184.97:article/651

041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: In this paper I try to highlight the relationship between self-centered Reasons and morality. My basic aim is to show that not even the most sophisticated attempts of current philosophical literature can bridge the wide gap that detaches from one another. I focus the "prisoner"s dilemma" showing that the best pay-off for everybody in that situation can only be obtained if everybody refuses to think in terms of the maximization of his or her utility and decides to cooperate keeping silent. I argue that this decision cannot be based in self-interested reasons because self-interested people can never generate the expectations needed for cooperation to arise. This impossibility stands as a wall against which Gauthier"s and Axelrod"s attempts bounce. Which I call in the text the metha-solution (Gauthier) and the iterated solution (Axelrod) cannot overcome the fact that knowing what the rest of as self-interested I would never cooperate because they will try to exploit my cooperation and were they altruistic I would never cooperate either because I will try to exploit their cooperation. Nevertheless there is a limited plausibility in the approaches I challenge which derives from the assumption that some people have already decide to cooperate not on bases of self-interested reasons but on reasons of different sort. Obviously this cannot serve as a proof of the existence of the bridge I referred above. Finally I sketch why there are reasons to be moral which make the decision of restraining my actions to preserve the interests of others a rational one.

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 19 Núm. 57 (1897); 87-107

773.1.#.o: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

022.#.#.a: ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

310.#.#.a: Cuatrimestral

300.#.#.a: Páginas: 87-107

264.#.1.b: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1897.651

handle: 00eef79eb240fbaf

harvesting_date: 2023-08-23 17:00:00.0

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245.1.0.b: El dilema de los prisioneros y la moral

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Artículo

El dilema de los prisioneros y la moral

Rosenkrantz, Carlos

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Rosenkrantz, Carlos (1897). El dilema de los prisioneros y la moral. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 19 Núm. 57, 1897; 87-107. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115442

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Rosenkrantz, Carlos
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
El dilema de los prisioneros y la moral
Fecha
2018-12-10
Resumen
In this paper I try to highlight the relationship between self-centered Reasons and morality. My basic aim is to show that not even the most sophisticated attempts of current philosophical literature can bridge the wide gap that detaches from one another. I focus the "prisoner"s dilemma" showing that the best pay-off for everybody in that situation can only be obtained if everybody refuses to think in terms of the maximization of his or her utility and decides to cooperate keeping silent. I argue that this decision cannot be based in self-interested reasons because self-interested people can never generate the expectations needed for cooperation to arise. This impossibility stands as a wall against which Gauthier"s and Axelrod"s attempts bounce. Which I call in the text the metha-solution (Gauthier) and the iterated solution (Axelrod) cannot overcome the fact that knowing what the rest of as self-interested I would never cooperate because they will try to exploit my cooperation and were they altruistic I would never cooperate either because I will try to exploit their cooperation. Nevertheless there is a limited plausibility in the approaches I challenge which derives from the assumption that some people have already decide to cooperate not on bases of self-interested reasons but on reasons of different sort. Obviously this cannot serve as a proof of the existence of the bridge I referred above. Finally I sketch why there are reasons to be moral which make the decision of restraining my actions to preserve the interests of others a rational one.
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

Enlaces