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336.#.#.a: Artículo

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856.4.0.u: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1058/1025

100.1.#.a: García, Claudia Lorena

524.#.#.a: García, Claudia Lorena (1997). El atomismo y las sustancias en Descartes. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 85, 1997; 65-94. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115735

245.1.0.a: El atomismo y las sustancias en Descartes

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1997

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506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico alberto@filosoficas.unam.mx

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041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: I argue that Descartes’ doctrine concerning the indefinite divisibility of any piece of matter amounts, for him, to the view that any such piece is actually composed of indefinitely many corporeal substances, each of which is really distinct from the others —something that no Seventeenth Century atomist could accept. Then, I distinguish and examine three concepts of substance in Descartes and argue that he cannot unproblematically assert that finite bodies —all of which are aggregates— are substances in either of the three senses of ‘substance’. Finally, I examine the different characterizations of the real distinction that, according to Descartes, exists among substances, and argue that he cannot claim that any two finite bodies are really distinct substances; hence, that he cannot support his contention that any piece of matter is indefinitely divisible. I conclude (1) that, ultimately, Descartes cannot sustain a convincing position against the atomist; and (2) that an examination of the notions of substance and of the real distinction in Descartes allow us to understand clearly some of the intellectual shifts that occur from Descartes to Spinoza and Leibniz.

773.1.#.t: Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 85 (1997); 65-94

773.1.#.o: https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica

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264.#.1.b: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1997.1058

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245.1.0.b: El atomismo y las sustancias en Descartes

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Artículo

El atomismo y las sustancias en Descartes

García, Claudia Lorena

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, publicado en Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

García, Claudia Lorena (1997). El atomismo y las sustancias en Descartes. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 85, 1997; 65-94. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4115735

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
García, Claudia Lorena
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
El atomismo y las sustancias en Descartes
Fecha
2019-01-08
Resumen
I argue that Descartes’ doctrine concerning the indefinite divisibility of any piece of matter amounts, for him, to the view that any such piece is actually composed of indefinitely many corporeal substances, each of which is really distinct from the others —something that no Seventeenth Century atomist could accept. Then, I distinguish and examine three concepts of substance in Descartes and argue that he cannot unproblematically assert that finite bodies —all of which are aggregates— are substances in either of the three senses of ‘substance’. Finally, I examine the different characterizations of the real distinction that, according to Descartes, exists among substances, and argue that he cannot claim that any two finite bodies are really distinct substances; hence, that he cannot support his contention that any piece of matter is indefinitely divisible. I conclude (1) that, ultimately, Descartes cannot sustain a convincing position against the atomist; and (2) that an examination of the notions of substance and of the real distinction in Descartes allow us to understand clearly some of the intellectual shifts that occur from Descartes to Spinoza and Leibniz.
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503

Enlaces