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Ver términos de la licencia Autor(es)
Cabrera Álvarez, Julio
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Cortando árboles y relaciones (una reflexión escéptica en torno a un tema de Searle)
Fecha
2018-12-07
Resumen
The notion of "literal meaning" can be considered to be a unifying category, "projected" onto the natural differentiation of uses of language. This precludes the usual ontological expressions, in the material mode of speech, such as "There exists a meaning, common to many occurrences of a term ", and the like. Although a certain theory of language allows the employment of such an unifying cathegory, this is not necessary for determining truth-conditions for sentences in which the term appears. These conditions can be determined, in fact, for each "cotext "; that is to say for each linguistic environment oí the tenn. This is an even morc skeptical approach than Searle"s criticisms against tendencies in the contemporary philosophy of language in which he attempts to determine truth-conditions independently from contextual considerations. [J.C.A.]
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503
DOI
https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1984.537