dor_id: 14493

506.#.#.a: Público

590.#.#.d: Los artículos enviados a la revista "Contaduría y Administración", se juzgan por medio de un proceso de revisión por pares

510.0.#.a: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACyT); Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); Scientific Electronic Library Online (SciELO); SCOPUS, SCImago Journal Rank (SJR)

561.#.#.u: https://www.fca.unam.mx/

650.#.4.x: Ciencias Sociales y Económicas

336.#.#.b: article

336.#.#.3: Artículo de Investigación

336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: http://www.cya.unam.mx/index.php/cya/index

351.#.#.b: Contaduría y Administración

351.#.#.a: Artículos

harvesting_group: RevistasUNAM

270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

590.#.#.c: Open Journal Systems (OJS)

270.#.#.d: MX

270.1.#.d: México

590.#.#.b: Concentrador

883.#.#.u: https://revistas.unam.mx/catalogo/

883.#.#.a: Revistas UNAM

590.#.#.a: Coordinación de Difusión Cultural

883.#.#.1: https://www.publicaciones.unam.mx/

883.#.#.q: Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial

850.#.#.a: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

856.4.0.u: http://www.cya.unam.mx/index.php/cya/article/view/1653/1317

100.1.#.a: Salehi, Mahdi; Jamalikazemini, Bahman; Farhangdoust, Shayan

524.#.#.a: Salehi, Mahdi, et al. (2018). Board compensation and disclosure quality: corporate governance interference. Contaduría y Administración; Vol. 63, Núm. 4. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/14493

245.1.0.a: Board compensation and disclosure quality: corporate governance interference

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Facultad de Contaduría y Administración, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 2018

264.#.1.c: 2018-08-15

653.#.#.a: Board compensation; disclosure quality; corporate governance

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.es, fecha de asignación de la licencia 2018-08-15, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico revista_cya@fca.unam.mx

884.#.#.k: http://www.cya.unam.mx/index.php/cya/article/view/1653

001.#.#.#: oai:cya.www.revistas-conacyt.unam.mx:article/1653

041.#.7.h: eng

520.3.#.a: This paper investigates the impact of financial information disclosure quality on board compensation in various corporate governance mechanisms in Iran. A unique data set from a sample of 176 Iranian listed firms over the period 2010-2016 is used in order to address the following questions: as an incentive mechanism for managers, is there any relationship between compensation and disclosure quality of financial information while some corporate governance factors are interfered? duality on board, educated members, females, and independent members are the aspects that are considered as corporate governance interference. Along with these issues, we investigate whether firm complexity is likely to affect the mentioned relationship. We find that corporate governance mechanisms including educated board members, independent members, females, and duality board members are not some reward-enhancing methods. This lends support to the conjecture that directors neglect the quality of information they provide, and as a consequence, they adjust their bonuses via other methods. Our findings indicate that there is a significant and positive relationship between board compensation and disclosure quality in firms which have complexed activities and foreign sales. Finally, we indicate that disclosure quality has no significant impact on compensation in firms which have complexed activity of controlling some subsidiaries.

773.1.#.t: Contaduría y Administración; Vol. 63, Núm. 4 (2018)

773.1.#.o: http://www.cya.unam.mx/index.php/cya/index

046.#.#.j: 2021-10-20 00:00:00.000000

022.#.#.a: ISSN electrónico: 2448-8410; ISSN impreso: 0186-1042

310.#.#.a: Trimestral

264.#.1.b: Facultad de Contaduría y Administración, UNAM

758.#.#.1: http://www.cya.unam.mx/index.php/cya/index

doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/fca.24488410e.2018.1653

handle: 00f218407b731634

harvesting_date: 2019-02-06 00:00:00.0

856.#.0.q: application/pdf

last_modified: 2023-03-22 16:00:00

license_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.es

license_type: by

_deleted_conflicts: 2-d2f712b69b1514c81a9f6307c9b71e0a

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