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590.#.#.d: Cada artículo es evaluado mediante una revisión ciega única. Los revisores son externos nacionales e internacionales

510.0.#.a: Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)

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336.#.#.3: Artículo de Investigación

336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: https://revistas.filos.unam.mx/index.php/theoria

351.#.#.b: Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía

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harvesting_group: RevistasUNAM

270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

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856.4.0.u: https://revistas.filos.unam.mx/index.php/theoria/article/view/421/2259

100.1.#.a: Ramos Villegas, Pedro Arturo

524.#.#.a: Ramos Villegas, Pedro Arturo (2017). Argumentos y explicaciones causales ordinarios: distinción teórica. Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía; Núm. 33, 2017; 51-78. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4137246

245.1.0.a: Argumentos y explicaciones causales ordinarios: distinción teórica

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 2017

264.#.1.c: 2017-12-01

653.#.#.a: Razonamiento; Explicación; Frege; Causa; Discurso

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico revista.theoria@filos.unam.mx

884.#.#.k: https://revistas.filos.unam.mx/index.php/theoria/article/view/421

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041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: In this paper I will try to show in its main lines, from some of Frege’s and Margáin-Davidson’s thesis, the theoretical framework from which we can draw the distinction between ordinary reasonings and causal explanations. Such framework clearly arises observing that reasonings and explanations belong to different kinds of linguistic objects, and that there are at least four different types of explanations corresponding to four different senses of the term ‘cause’ cause as (necessary and/or sufficient) condition and cause as causal event. This emerges from such drawing explanations presupposing the notion of cause in the conditional sense are reducible to reasonings; but not those presupposing it in the sense of causal event. The main point of all of this resides in the enormous similitude that exists between ordinary reasonings and explanations, and in that it has been sustained, inside the subject’s literature (remarkably in Hempel), that such explanations, being just a kind of enthymematic reasoning, are necessarily incomplete, provisional or mere sketches needed of justification; but they are not. The picture that eventually emerges on such distinctions is this ordinary reasonings and explanations are two relatively distinct types of discourses with a vast common zone of intersection, but with huge disjunct or detached zones between them too.

773.1.#.t: Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía; Núm. 33 (2017); 51-78

773.1.#.o: https://revistas.filos.unam.mx/index.php/theoria

022.#.#.a: ISSN electrónico: 2954-4270; ISSN impreso: 1665-6415

310.#.#.a: Semestral

300.#.#.a: Páginas: 51-78

264.#.1.b: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, UNAM

doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.2017.33.421

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Artículo

Argumentos y explicaciones causales ordinarios: distinción teórica

Ramos Villegas, Pedro Arturo

Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, UNAM, publicado en Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Ramos Villegas, Pedro Arturo (2017). Argumentos y explicaciones causales ordinarios: distinción teórica. Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía; Núm. 33, 2017; 51-78. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4137246

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Ramos Villegas, Pedro Arturo
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Argumentos y explicaciones causales ordinarios: distinción teórica
Fecha
2017-12-01
Resumen
In this paper I will try to show in its main lines, from some of Frege’s and Margáin-Davidson’s thesis, the theoretical framework from which we can draw the distinction between ordinary reasonings and causal explanations. Such framework clearly arises observing that reasonings and explanations belong to different kinds of linguistic objects, and that there are at least four different types of explanations corresponding to four different senses of the term ‘cause’ cause as (necessary and/or sufficient) condition and cause as causal event. This emerges from such drawing explanations presupposing the notion of cause in the conditional sense are reducible to reasonings; but not those presupposing it in the sense of causal event. The main point of all of this resides in the enormous similitude that exists between ordinary reasonings and explanations, and in that it has been sustained, inside the subject’s literature (remarkably in Hempel), that such explanations, being just a kind of enthymematic reasoning, are necessarily incomplete, provisional or mere sketches needed of justification; but they are not. The picture that eventually emerges on such distinctions is this ordinary reasonings and explanations are two relatively distinct types of discourses with a vast common zone of intersection, but with huge disjunct or detached zones between them too.
Tema
Razonamiento; Explicación; Frege; Causa; Discurso
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 2954-4270; ISSN impreso: 1665-6415

Enlaces