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Verdejo, Víctor M.
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Against Artifactual Epistemic Privilege
Fecha
2018-12-10
Resumen
The deep intentional roots of artifacts and artifactual kinds seem to give intuitive as well as philosophical support to a form of epistemic privilege for makers regarding the objects they create. In this paper, I critically examine the thesis of epistemic privilege for artifact creators and present a counterexample based on anti-individualism. Several objections to the counterexample are considered and responded to. I conclude that, if anti-individualism is true, then the alleged epistemic privilege of creators of artifacts is either false or an explanatorily idle label. I argue, finally, that even if anti-individualism forces us to reject epistemic privilege for artifact kinds, these kinds may exhibit metaphysical and semantic mind-dependence, something that would keep them still distinctly apart from natural kinds and leave their essentially intentional nature untouched.
Tema
author; creation; concept possession; anti-individualism; mind-dependence; autor; creación; posesión de conceptos; antiindividualismo; dependencia mental
Idioma
eng
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 1870-4905; ISSN impreso: 0011-1503
