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590.#.#.d: Cada artículo es evaluado mediante una revisión ciega única. Los revisores son externos nacionales e internacionales

510.0.#.a: Sistema Regional de Información en Línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal (Latindex); Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)

561.#.#.u: http://www.filos.unam.mx/

650.#.4.x: Artes y Humanidades

336.#.#.b: article

336.#.#.3: Artículo de Investigación

336.#.#.a: Artículo

351.#.#.6: https://revistas.filos.unam.mx/index.php/theoria

351.#.#.b: Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía

351.#.#.a: Artículos

harvesting_group: RevistasUNAM

270.1.#.p: Revistas UNAM. Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial, UNAM en revistas@unam.mx

590.#.#.c: Open Journal Systems (OJS)

270.#.#.d: MX

270.1.#.d: México

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883.#.#.u: https://revistas.unam.mx/catalogo/

883.#.#.a: Revistas UNAM

590.#.#.a: Coordinación de Difusión Cultural

883.#.#.1: https://www.publicaciones.unam.mx/

883.#.#.q: Dirección General de Publicaciones y Fomento Editorial

850.#.#.a: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

856.4.0.u: https://revistas.filos.unam.mx/index.php/theoria/article/view/195/1876

100.1.#.a: Rowe, Christopher

524.#.#.a: Rowe, Christopher (1998). Matar a Sócrates: los pensamientos tardíos de Platón acerca de la democracia. Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía; Núm. 6, 1998; 53-74. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4137076

245.1.0.a: Matar a Sócrates: los pensamientos tardíos de Platón acerca de la democracia

502.#.#.c: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

561.1.#.a: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, UNAM

264.#.0.c: 1998

264.#.1.c: 1998-11-01

653.#.#.a: Platón como escéptico; Dos tipos de democracia; Buena imitación de lo mejor; Sabiduría; Excursiones intelectuales; Escepticismo; Platón; Democracia

506.1.#.a: La titularidad de los derechos patrimoniales de esta obra pertenece a las instituciones editoras. Su uso se rige por una licencia Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Internacional, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.es, para un uso diferente consultar al responsable jurídico del repositorio por medio del correo electrónico revista.theoria@filos.unam.mx

884.#.#.k: https://revistas.filos.unam.mx/index.php/theoria/article/view/195

001.#.#.#: 125.oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/195

041.#.7.h: spa

520.3.#.a: This paper conceives itself as part of a larger effort that sets out to mediateamong the opposed visions of Plato as a dogmatic thinker and as a skeptic.In particular, the paper is a challenge to, and a refutation of, a particularinterpretation on the late Plato. The interpretation opposed implies that,in his later years, Plato did without much of what he himself consideredtrue and valuable earlier, and that he would have ultimately rejectedthat particular concern with human happiness and virtue that we associatewith his name, and that of his teacher, Socrates. Rowe objects also to undiscriminating recourse to the kind of developmental approach thatunderlies the interpretation, stressing the importance of sticking to Plato’sarguments and resorting to developmental considerations only if andwhen all else fails. The object under scrutiny here is the standard versionof the Statesman (constructed from the text of 297c up to 302b, andparticularly 300a-301a). The basic interpretive aspect challenged is theidea that at some point, Plato’s perspective of politics was drasticallyaltered, this shift (from the ruling of philosopher-kings to an impersonalset of laws) being marked by the Statesman, and seen thus as a revaluation,on Plato’s part, of the merits of democracy. The paradigm of the standardview on that dialogue, as stated by G. H. Sabine, argues that, if the bestform of government (the exclusive rule of philosophers) is impossible,and we should be content with the second-best (absolute obedience to anyexisting laws including democratic ones), then any research that couldcause disregard for these laws should be utterly proscribed. But in thiscase, Plato would be implying that Athenian democracy would have beenjustified in putting Socrates to death. And this claim is one that Rowe isprepared to firmly reject. Analysis and discussion of the most relevantpassage (reproduced first in J. B. Skemp’s translation, then in Rowe’s own)lead to 1) rejection of the [wrong] reading that ‘existing laws’ are alludedto as “imitations or copies of the truth” by the Eleatic Stranger, and 2)recognition that the reference is to the ideal laws or ideal constitutionproduced by someone knowledgeable (and so, in fact, exclude not just anyone, but all the recognized forms of constitution, including democracy).Another point discussed involves the distinction between the “second best”in the Statesman and the Laws. Rowe shows how developmentalism canbe a dangerous instrument of interpretation (especially if employed withexclusion of other approaches) and so there are no grounds either forlegitimately attributing Plato any justification of Athenian democracyfor killing Socrates. The last section closes firstly by dealing with aPopperian objection (that even if Plato did not come finally to approve ofSocrates’ execution by Athenian democracy, he nevertheless betrayed himin the end), by insisting in Socrates’ (the ‘familiar’, ‘ignorant’ Socrates)comebacks throughout Plato’s last dialogues (up to the Philebus), and bypointing to the characterization of philosophy as search, a partial ratherthan a perfect knowledge, and to the fact that philosophy, as accomplishedknowledge, appears only in utopian contexts.

773.1.#.t: Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía; Núm. 6 (1998); 53-74

773.1.#.o: https://revistas.filos.unam.mx/index.php/theoria

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310.#.#.a: Semestral

300.#.#.a: Páginas: 53-74

264.#.1.b: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, UNAM

doi: https://doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.1998.6.195

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Artículo

Matar a Sócrates: los pensamientos tardíos de Platón acerca de la democracia

Rowe, Christopher

Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, UNAM, publicado en Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía, y cosechado de Revistas UNAM

Licencia de uso

Procedencia del contenido

Cita

Rowe, Christopher (1998). Matar a Sócrates: los pensamientos tardíos de Platón acerca de la democracia. Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía; Núm. 6, 1998; 53-74. Recuperado de https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/4137076

Descripción del recurso

Autor(es)
Rowe, Christopher
Tipo
Artículo de Investigación
Área del conocimiento
Artes y Humanidades
Título
Matar a Sócrates: los pensamientos tardíos de Platón acerca de la democracia
Fecha
1998-11-01
Resumen
This paper conceives itself as part of a larger effort that sets out to mediateamong the opposed visions of Plato as a dogmatic thinker and as a skeptic.In particular, the paper is a challenge to, and a refutation of, a particularinterpretation on the late Plato. The interpretation opposed implies that,in his later years, Plato did without much of what he himself consideredtrue and valuable earlier, and that he would have ultimately rejectedthat particular concern with human happiness and virtue that we associatewith his name, and that of his teacher, Socrates. Rowe objects also to undiscriminating recourse to the kind of developmental approach thatunderlies the interpretation, stressing the importance of sticking to Plato’sarguments and resorting to developmental considerations only if andwhen all else fails. The object under scrutiny here is the standard versionof the Statesman (constructed from the text of 297c up to 302b, andparticularly 300a-301a). The basic interpretive aspect challenged is theidea that at some point, Plato’s perspective of politics was drasticallyaltered, this shift (from the ruling of philosopher-kings to an impersonalset of laws) being marked by the Statesman, and seen thus as a revaluation,on Plato’s part, of the merits of democracy. The paradigm of the standardview on that dialogue, as stated by G. H. Sabine, argues that, if the bestform of government (the exclusive rule of philosophers) is impossible,and we should be content with the second-best (absolute obedience to anyexisting laws including democratic ones), then any research that couldcause disregard for these laws should be utterly proscribed. But in thiscase, Plato would be implying that Athenian democracy would have beenjustified in putting Socrates to death. And this claim is one that Rowe isprepared to firmly reject. Analysis and discussion of the most relevantpassage (reproduced first in J. B. Skemp’s translation, then in Rowe’s own)lead to 1) rejection of the [wrong] reading that ‘existing laws’ are alludedto as “imitations or copies of the truth” by the Eleatic Stranger, and 2)recognition that the reference is to the ideal laws or ideal constitutionproduced by someone knowledgeable (and so, in fact, exclude not just anyone, but all the recognized forms of constitution, including democracy).Another point discussed involves the distinction between the “second best”in the Statesman and the Laws. Rowe shows how developmentalism canbe a dangerous instrument of interpretation (especially if employed withexclusion of other approaches) and so there are no grounds either forlegitimately attributing Plato any justification of Athenian democracyfor killing Socrates. The last section closes firstly by dealing with aPopperian objection (that even if Plato did not come finally to approve ofSocrates’ execution by Athenian democracy, he nevertheless betrayed himin the end), by insisting in Socrates’ (the ‘familiar’, ‘ignorant’ Socrates)comebacks throughout Plato’s last dialogues (up to the Philebus), and bypointing to the characterization of philosophy as search, a partial ratherthan a perfect knowledge, and to the fact that philosophy, as accomplishedknowledge, appears only in utopian contexts.
Tema
Platón como escéptico; Dos tipos de democracia; Buena imitación de lo mejor; Sabiduría; Excursiones intelectuales; Escepticismo; Platón; Democracia
Idioma
spa
ISSN
ISSN electrónico: 2954-4270; ISSN impreso: 1665-6415

Enlaces